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Abstract
This paper studies party discipline in a congress within a political agency framework
with retrospective voting. Party discipline serves as an incentive device to induce o¢ ce-
motivated congress members to perform in line with the party leaderships objective of
controlling both the executive and the legislative branches of government. I show rst
that the same party is more likely to control both branches of government (i.e., unied
government) the stronger the party discipline in the congress is. Second, the leader of
the governing party imposes more party discipline under unied government than does
the opposition leader under divided government. Moreover, the incumbentsaggregate
performance increases with party discipline, so a representative voter becomes better o¤.
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1. Introduction
In modern democracies, party discipline is dened as the ability of the leadership of a party to
control its members in the legislature. Party discipline usually refers to the ability of a party
leader to get her partys congress members to support the party line rather than to follow the
special interests of their home districts. Party discipline has been a topic of frequent study in
the empirical literature (see Heller and Mershon 2008, Krehbiel 2000, McCarty et al. 2001,
Rohde 1991, and Snyder and Groseclose 2000, among many others).
A number of authors have produced formal models of party discipline. For example,
some researchers have elaborated on informational arguments, pointing out that strong party
discipline informs voters about the future policy of a candidate who, once elected, cannot
deviate from the partys o¢ cial platform (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2004, Castan-
heira and Crutzen 2010, Cox and McCubbins 1993, Snyder and Ting 2002). In a similar vein,
Grossman and Helpman (2008) dened party discipline as a partys ability to induce ex-post
adherence to a preannounced position. In other words, the level of party discipline determines
the extent of commitment to party platforms."1 In some other studies, party discipline has
been modeled as the ability of the party leadership to control its members in the legisla-
ture such that they vote in line with the partys ideological position (Colomer 2005, Eguia
2011, Iaryczower 2008, McGillivray 1997, Patty 2008, Volden and Bergman 2006). In these
models, the party leadersobjective is to discipline party members who might have di¤erent
ideological preferences. Diermeier and Feddersen (1998a, 1998b) provided an institutional
explanation for cohesive voting of legislators in parliamentary systems. They showed that
the vote-of-condence procedure common in parliamentary democracies creates an incentive
for cohesion in voting.
This paper complements the aforementioned literature by analyzing party discipline under
the assumption of o¢ ce-motivated party leaders who want their party to control both the
executive and the legislative branches of government. In the framework used here, party
leaders impose party discipline on their congress members in order to motivate the latter
to perform in line with the partys objective of controlling the two branches of government
rather than to only seek reelection in their home districts. The paper therefore emphasizes
the role of party discipline as an incentive device that motivates congress members to perform
in the interests of their party leadership.
In this paper, I build a political agency model of interaction between o¢ ce-motivated
politicians (an executive, an opposition leader, and a congress member) and their constituency
1Grossman and Helpman (2008), p. 330.
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in the presence of a moral hazard problem.2 A representative voter cares about the politicians
performances, which are observable but not contractible. The executive, as the leader of the
governing party, cares about her party controlling the executive and legislative branches of
government. This means that the executive seeks to be reelected herself and also wants her
partisan ally to win in the congressional election. The leader of the opposition also wants her
party to win the executive and legislative elections, and so wants the incumbent executive
to be thrown out of o¢ ce (which would lead the opposition to win the presidential election)
and wants the congress to be controlled by her partisan ally.
Consider rst a benchmark case with no party discipline in the congress. The incumbent
congress member is o¢ ce-motivated and cares only about his own reelection chances. The
representative voter applies optimal retrospective voting rules to reward the incumbents. The
executive is reelected if her performance exceeds an optimal threshold. The reelection of the
congress member is conditioned on the congress members own performance and also on the
executives performance in order to incentivize the executive, who cares about the reelec-
tion prospects of the congress member. Moreover, the voter will use di¤erent retrospective
voting rules in the cases of unied and divided government. Under unied government, the
executive wants her partys congress member to be reelected in the coming election. The
incumbentspreferences are therefore positively aligned, which implies positively correlated
optimal retrospective voting rules. In the case of divided government, the executive prefers
the congress member to be thrown out of o¢ ce so that the executives partisan ally wins the
congressional election. The incumbentspreferences are thus negatively aligned, and so are
the optimal retrospective voting rules.
Assume now that the party leaders (i.e., the executive and the opposition leader) can
impose costly party discipline on their partys congress member. The executive will impose
party discipline on her partys congress member in the case of unied government, whereas the
opposition leader will do so in the case of divided government (when the congress is controlled
by the opposition leaders partisan ally). Party discipline means that the congress member
supports the goals of the party leadership. In the framework used here, this implies that
the congress member will share the party leaders objective of controlling the two branches
of government. Strong party discipline thus leads to further alignment of the incumbents
preferences. In the case of unied government, a disciplined congress member wants the
executive to be reelected in the coming elections, and so the incumbentspreferences become
even more positively aligned. Under divided government, in contrast, the congress member
2For the sake of tractability, it is assumed that there is a single national district and that the congress
therefore consists of one congress member.
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prefers the executive to be thrown out of o¢ ce, which makes the incumbentspreferences even
more negatively aligned. The voter thus adopts more correlated (positively under unied
government or negatively under divided government) retrospective voting rules to motivate
the congress member to perform better.
The party leaders choose to impose party discipline in order to delegate", in some sense,
the partys goal of controlling the two branches of government to their partys congress
members. Strong party discipline means more aligned incumbents preferences. In turn,
the latter implies more correlated retrospective voting rules, which motivate the congress
member to exert higher e¤ort. The executive can therefore can free-ride" on the congress
members performance, which leads to lower e¤ort by the executive. Nonetheless, stronger
party discipline increases the incumbentsaggregate performance, making the voter better
o¤. Moreover, if party discipline were cheap to impose, the party leaders would choose
to discipline their partys congress member as much as possible, since the probability of
controlling the two branches of government increases with party discipline. Under unied
government, the reelection outcomes of the incumbents are positively correlated. Stronger
party discipline increases this correlation further. Therefore, the incumbents are more likely
to be reelected together. In the case of divided government, the reelection outcomes are
negatively correlated, and they become even more negatively correlated the stronger the
party discipline is. It is more likely then that the congress member is reelected while the
executive is thrown out of o¢ ce.
My results indicate that the leader of the governing party, i.e., the executive, imposes
more party discipline under unied government than the opposition leader does under divided
government. The reason is that stronger party discipline allows the executive to free-ride on
the congress members performance and reduces the executives e¤ort (and the associated
cost). Thus, the executive takes this e¤ect into account when choosing the level of party
discipline in the congress, which results in stronger party discipline under unied government
than under divided government.
The retrospective-voting approach in the political agency framework used here started
with the seminal work of Barro (1973), to be followed by the work of Ferejohn (1986), Persson
et al. (1997), Austen-Smith and Banks (1989), Banks and Sundaram (1993, 1996), and others.
In addition to having a sound theoretical framework, this approach has received considerable
empirical support (see, for example, Peltzman 1992 and Besley and Case 1995a, 1995b, 2003).
Besley (2006) emphasizes the empirical potential of these models in explaining real world
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policy choices."3 In a recent article in the New York Times, Glaeser pointed out that the
president . . . is both our leader and our employee. We (the voters) chose him, our taxes pay
his salary, and we can re him in four years."4 The political agency approach may therefore
be appropriate for modeling political interactions between politicians and voters. Even so,
elected politicians can only be o¤ered implicit incentive schemes; it is di¢ cult to reward
public policies with explicit contracts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines a model. Section 3
presents the formal analysis. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. Model
Consider a single national district where an executive E and a congress member C implement
policies on behalf of a representative voter.5 There is no ideological heterogeneity in the
politiciansand voterspolicy preferences.6 Each politician i 2 fE;Cg performs a policy task
determined by her unobservable e¤ort ei  0 and her random ability ai  N
 
0; 2

.7 The
cost of the e¤ort of politician i is given by e
2
i
2 .
8,9 Ability and e¤ort are additive. Politician
is performance
pi = ei + ai
(but not its composition in terms of e¤ort and ability) is observed by the representative
voter.10
3Besley (2006), p. 3.
4Edward L. Glaeser Lower (and more realistic) presidential expectations," January 20, 2009. Available
online at http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/lower-and-more-realistic-presidential-expectations/
(accessed December 1, 2010).
5One district is assumed in order to keep the analysis clean and the results tractable. The analysis of a
model where there are several districts and where a representative voter from each district elects a congress
member to the national legislature is left for future research.
6Since there is no heterogeneity in policy preferences, I can, without loss of generality, assume a represen-
tative voter.
7Assuming a nonzero average ability of the politicians leads to more complicated algebra but similar results.
An analysis of this case is available upon request.
8A simple cost specication e
2
i
2
allows a closed-form solution in this framework. The results would be
qualitatively the same for a strictly convex and increasing cost function.
9An extended version of the model is available upon request, where the cost of e¤ort for an executive and
a congress member under unied government is di¤erent from that under divided government (e.g., because
of synergy). The results of this extended model are qualitatively the same.
10The representative voter is assumed to observe the politiciansperformances separately. One can think,
for example, of pork barrel spending as a measure of the congress members performance, and of the nations
overall performance as a measure of the executives performance.
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I assume that there are two political parties and that each politician is a¢ liated with one
of these parties. The state variable   2 fU;Dg is introduced, where   = U corresponds to the
case of unied government (i.e., the same party controls the two branches of government) and
  = D corresponds to the case of divided government (i.e., one party controls the presidential
(executive) o¢ ce and the other party controls the congress).
The presidential and congressional elections are held simultaneously. In each election,
the candidates (an incumbent and a challenger) are a¢ liated with opposite parties. The
incumbents and the challengers are identical in all respects except party label.
Politicians
Consider rst a contest for the presidential o¢ ce. It is assumed that the incumbent executive
is the leader of one political party and the challenger is the leader of the other political
party. As party leaders, they care about their partys chances of controlling the two branches
of government.11 Their goal is to maximize the probability of their party winning in the
presidential and congressional elections. So the net objective function of the incumbent
executive E, denoted by 	 E , in state  , is given by
	UE (eE ; eC) = Pr (E is reelected and C is reelected) 
e2E
2
;
	DE (eE ; eC) = Pr (E is reelected and C is not reelected) 
e2E
2
:
First, in each of the two states, the executive E wants to be reelected. Second, in the case of
unied government,   = U , the executive E prefers the congress member C to be reelected
too. In the case of divided government,   = D, E wants the incumbent congress member to
be thrown out of o¢ ce. This implies that the challenger (from Es party) will be elected in
the congressional election.
The leader of the opposition, denoted by O, is a challenger for the presidential o¢ ce and
has the same objective (in reverse). O wants both incumbents to be dismissed in the case
of unied government,   = U , which would imply Os own appointment to the executive
o¢ ce and her partisan allys election to the congress. In the case of divided government,
11Several authors have made similar assumptions about politicianspartisan preferences. Fréchette et al.
(2008) assumed that the party leaders objective is to maximize the reelection chances of the partys incumbent
politicians. In turn, Brollo and Nannicini (2010) assumed that an executive wants to maximize the political
capital represented by aligned mayors" by increasing the likelihood that a municipality is run by a mayor
aligned with the central government. Zudenkova (2011) considered politicians with aligned preferences who
care about their partys overall representation in the executive and legislative branches of government, and
not just their own reelection prospects.
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  = D, the opposition leader wants the congress member C to be reelected and the executive
E to be thrown out of o¢ ce, which would lead to Os party controlling the two branches of
government. Os objective function, 	 O, is
	UO (eE ; eC) = Pr (E is not reelected and C is not reelected) ;
	DO (eE ; eC) = Pr (E is not reelected and C is reelected) :
The party leaders can impose a certain type of control, known as party discipline, on
their congress members. In modern democracies, party discipline usually refers to the ability
of a party leader to get her partys congress members to support the partys goals rather
than to follow the special interests of their home districts. In the absence of party discipline,
a congress member just wants to satisfy the wishes of a representative voter in his home
district in order to be reelected in the coming elections. In the context of the present model,
no party discipline would mean that congress member Cs objective would be simply to
maximize his reelection probability PrC (eC). Assume now that the party leaders can ensure
party discipline by imposing the partys objective (i.e., their own objective) on their partys
congress members. In particular, a party leader j 2 fE;Og can impose a level of party
discipline #j 2 [0; 1] to get her partys congress member to support the partys o¢ cial goal
of controlling the two branches of government. I assume that this level of party discipline
determines the strength with which congress member C shares the preferences of his party
leadership. Party discipline is costly to enforce; the cost is
k#2j
2 , with k > 0, and can be
interpreted as the cost of party whips, whose primary task is to ensure party discipline
in the legislature (usually by o¤ering rewards to party members or threatening them with
punishment). The opposition leader O cannot impose party discipline in the case of unied
government, since the congress member C belongs to the governing party. O can, however,
ensure party discipline in the case of divided government by making her partys congress
member C support the partys objective of holding both branches of government. In turn, the
executive E can control her partys congress member only in the case of unied government.
Under divided government, E has no party member in the congress. Thus, it follows that
the congress members net objective function, denoted by 	 C , becomes
	UC (eE ; eC) = #EPr (E is reelected and C is reelected) + PrC (eC) 
e2C
2
;
	DC (eE ; eC) = #OPr (E is not reelected and C is reelected) + PrC (eC) 
e2C
2
:
The reasonable assumption here is that even with party discipline, the congress member still
values his own reelection more than his party leaderships goal of controlling both branches
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of government. That is why the congress members own reelection probability is included in
the objective function.
Note that the politicians incentives are aligned, as the politicians share their partys
common goal of controlling both branches of government. As a party leader, the executive
(in addition to her own reelection) cares also about her partys chances of winning in the
congressional election. Moreover, party discipline can be enforced in the congress such that
the congress member performs not only in his own self-interest but also in the interests of his
party leadership. In the case of unied government, the executive can impose party discipline
on her partys congress member. Then the incumbentspreferences are positively aligned, as
each incumbent (in addition to her own reelection) also wants her counterpart to be reelected.
In the case of divided government, the opposition leader can enforce the partys objective on
her partys congress member. The incumbentspreferences are then negatively aligned, as
each incumbent wants to be reelected herself and wants her counterpart to be thrown out of
o¢ ce (which implies the reelection of her partisan ally).
Representative Voter
The voter cares about policy outcomes according to a linear utility function
pE + pC :
The politicians are held accountable for their performance at the moment of election. I
assume that the voter uses retrospective voting to reappoint the incumbents, i.e., bases the
reelection decision on the politiciansperformances pE and pC to incentivize their e¤orts.
The incumbents care not only about their own reelection prospects but also about their
parties chances of controlling the two branches of government. This gives the voter an
additional tool to increase the politiciansaccountability. The voter will reward politician i
for that politicians own performance pi in order to give her an incentive to perform well.
Moreover, since executive E cares about the reelection chances of congress member C, the
voter will condition the reelection of the latter on the executives performance pE . This
will provide an extra incentive for the executive, who wants her partisan ally to win in the
congressional election. In the same vein, since congress member C might also share the party
leaders objective of controlling the two branches of government, the executives reelection will
be conditioned on the congress members performance pC , to incentivize congress member C.
Therefore, owing to the alignment of the incumbentspreferences, the optimal retrospective
voting rule for incumbent is reelection might depend on both incumbentsperformances, pE
and pC . It is assumed here that the voter applies linear retrospective rules determined by
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scalars E (for Es reelection) and C (for Cs reelection), E ; C 2 R.12 In particular, the
voter conditions the reelection of executive E on the joint performance of the two incumbents
given by a linear combination pE + EpC . By analogy, the reelection of congress member C
depends on pC+CpE . To prevent bizarre outcomes (such as the possibility that incumbents
with poor performances might be reelected while ones with better performances are not), the
restriction EC < 1 is imposed.
The voter knows that the only alternative to reappointing incumbents is to elect chal-
lengers of average ability who will exert equilibrium e¤orts e0E and e
0
C (where e
0
i denotes
the voters perception of ei). Thus, the voter compares the incumbentsperformances with
their challengers expected performances and votes accordingly. The executive E will be
reelected if pE + EpC  e0E + Ee0C . In turn, congress member C will be reappointed if
pC + CpE  e0C + Ce0E .
Intuition suggests that the optimal retrospective voting rules will di¤er between the two
states. In the case of unied government, the positively aligned incumbents preferences
imply that the executive has an extra incentive to perform well if the congress members
reelection chances increase with the executives performance. By analogy, if the congress
members success raises the executives reelection prospects, then the congress member is
more eager to perform well. However, in the case of divided government, the negatively
aligned incumbentspreferences lead to di¤erent optimal reelection rules. In this case, each
incumbent will perform better if her success decreases the reelection chances of her incumbent
counterpart, a¢ liated with the rival political party.
Timing
This is a sequential game between the politicians and the representative voter. The timing
of events is as follows. First, the incumbents are drawn randomly, and a state   2 fU;Dg is
realized. Second, in the case of unied government,   = U , the executive E imposes a level
of party discipline #E on the congress. In the case of divided government,   = D, it is the
leader of the opposition O who imposes a level of party discipline #O on the congress. Next,
the voter commits to retrospective voting rules determined by scalars E (for Es reelection)
and C (for Cs reelection). The incumbents then exert e¤orts eE and eC . Finally, the
politiciansabilities aE and aC are realized, and policy outcomes pE and pC are observed.
The presidential and congressional elections are held simultaneously, and the voter applies
the chosen retrospective voting rules to reward (reelect) or punish (dismiss) the incumbents.
12Linear retrospective rules are considered for reasons of tractability, as they allow a closed-form solution.
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The game is analyzed backwards to solve for a subgame perfect equilibrium. The incum-
bentse¤orts e E and e
 
C in each state   2 fU;Dg under linear rules E and C are found
rst. Next, I solve for the scalars  E and 
 
C that determine the voters retrospective voting
rules in each state  . Finally, I examine the executives choice of #E (if   = U) and the
opposition leaders choice of #O (if   = D) for imposing party discipline on their partys
congress members.
Intuition
Intuitively, the party leadersobjectives of controlling the two branches of government imply
the alignment of the incumbents preferences. The voter conditions the reelection of the
congress member on the performances of the two incumbents in order to provide the correct
incentives to the executive. Imposing party discipline on the congress member leads to even
further alignment of the incumbents preferences, which is used by the voter to increase
accountability. In the presence of party discipline, the voter will condition the reelection of
each incumbent on the performances of both of them. In other words, party discipline in the
congress serves as an extra incentive device for the congress member. The party leaders will
choose to enforce a certain level of party discipline that allows them to delegate" to their
partys congress member the implementation of the task of controlling the two branches of
government.
3. Analysis
Consider the incumbentsdecisions about the e¤orts e E and e
 
C under linear rules E and C
when the executive has chosen #E in the case of unied government and the opposition leader
has chosen #O in the case of divided government. The executives net objective function is
given by
	UE (eE ; eC) = Pr
 
pE + EpC  e0E + Ee0C
	 \ pC + CpE  e0C + Ce0E	  e2E2   k#2E2 ;
	DE (eE ; eC) = Pr
 
pE + EpC  e0E + Ee0C
	 \ pC + CpE < e0C + Ce0E	  e2E2 ;
where pE = eE + aE and pC = eC + aC . The congress members net objective function
depends on the level of party discipline and is given by
	UC (eE ; eC) = #EPr
 
pE + EpC  e0E + Ee0C
	 \ pC + CpE  e0C + Ce0E	
+Pr
 
pC + CpE  e0C + Ce0E
  e2C
2
;
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	DC (eE ; eC) = #OPr
 
pE + EpC < e
0
E + Ee
0
C
	 \ pC + CpE  e0C + Ce0E	
+Pr
 
pC + CpE  e0C + Ce0E
  e2C
2
:
The incumbents make e¤orts eE and eC before knowing the realizations of their abilities aE
and aC , and take the voters expectations e0E and e
0
C as given. The following proposition
establishes results for the incumbentse¤orts e E and e
 
C under linear rules E and C . (A
proof can be found in the Appendix.)
Proposition 1. Under linear retrospective voting rules E and C , EC < 1, the incum-
bents exert e¤orts e E and e
 
C equal to
eUE =
1
2
p
2
0@ 1q
1 + 2E
+
Cq
1 + 2C
1A ;
eUC =
#E
2
p
2
0@ 1q
1 + 2C
+
Eq
1 + 2E
1A+ 1p
2
q
1 + 2C
in the case of unied government,   = U , and
eDE =
1
2
p
2
0@ 1q
1 + 2E
  Cq
1 + 2C
1A ;
eDC =
#O
2
p
2
0@ 1q
1 + 2C
  Eq
1 + 2E
1A+ 1p
2
q
1 + 2C
in the case of divided government,   = D.
I turn now to the voters choice of linear retrospective voting rules determined by the
scalars E and C . Maximizing E (pE + pC) = e E + e
 
C with respect to E and C yields an
equilibrium. The results are summarized in the following proposition (the proof is straight-
forward).
Proposition 2. The optimal linear retrospective voting rules that the voter uses for the
incumbentsreelection are determined by scalars  E and 
 
C such that
UE = #E and 
U
C =
1
2 + #E
in the case of unied government,   = U , and
DE =  #O and DC =  
1
2 + #O
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in the case of divided government,   = D.13 Under these optimal rules, the politicianse¤orts
are equal to
eUE =
1
2
p
2
0@ 1q
1 + #2E
+
1q
5 + 4#E + #
2
E
1A ;
eUC =
1
2
p
2
0@ #2Eq
1 + #2E
+
(2 + #E)
2q
5 + 4#E + #
2
E
1A
in the case of unied government,   = U , and
eDE =
1
2
p
2
0@ 1q
1 + #2O
+
1q
5 + 4#O + #
2
O
1A ;
eDC =
1
2
p
2
0@ #2Oq
1 + #2O
+
(2 + #O)
2q
5 + 4#O + #
2
O
1A
in the case of divided government,   = D.
As expected, in the case of unied government, the reelection of one incumbent is pos-
itively correlated with the performance of the other incumbent. Thus, the success of one
incumbent promotes the reelection of the other incumbent. So the positively aligned incum-
bentspreferences imply positively correlated reelection outcomes under unied government.
In the case of divided government, the reelection of one incumbent is negatively correlated
with the performance of the other incumbent. Therefore, the success of one incumbent hin-
ders the reelection of the other incumbent. Thus, under divided government, the negatively
aligned incumbentspreferences lead to negatively correlated reelection outcomes. In fact,
two-sided coattail e¤ects arise. On the one hand, the executives performance a¤ects the
congress members reelection, which implies a presidential coattail e¤ect. On the other hand,
the executives reelection depends on the congress members performance, which results in a
reverse coattail e¤ect.14
Moreover, in the absence of party discipline, #j = 0, j 2 fE;Og, the voter uses a joint
retrospective voting rule only to reward the congress member C. The optimal rule for reap-
pointing executive E is a simple cuto¤ rule such that E is reelected if her performance pE
exceeds the equilibrium level of e¤ort e0E (where e
0
E denotes the voters perception of eE).
Intuitively, in the absence of party discipline, the congress member C cares only about his
13Note that the equilibrium values of  E and 
 
C satisfy the condition 
 
E
 
C < 1.
14See Zudenkova (2011) for a formal model of coattail voting.
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own reelection; for that reason, there is no way to incentivize the congress member by con-
ditioning the executives reelection on Cs performance. If party discipline is enforced in the
congress, #j 6= 0, the congress member will share his party leaders goal of controlling both
branches of government. So the congress member will care about the executives reelection
prospects, and the voter can incentivize the congress member by conditioning Es reelection
on the congress members performance. There are thus two forces at work to motivate the
congress member to perform well. First, the party leader imposes party discipline to align the
congress members preferences with those of the party leadership. Second, given this align-
ment of preferences, the voter conditions the executives reelection on the congress members
performance. These two forces jointly serve as an incentive device to encourage the congress
member to exert higher e¤ort.
The stronger the party discipline (represented by #j) in the congress, the more correlated
(positively if   = U and negatively if   = D) Es reelection is with Cs performance. Indeed,
the more the congress member shares the party leaderships objective of controlling the two
branches of government, the more incentive the congress member has to perform better.
The voter provides the congress member with an optimal incentive scheme by making the
executives reelection more dependent (positively if   = U and negatively if   = D) on the
congress members performance. However, the stronger the party discipline in the congress,
the less correlated (positively if   = U and negatively if   = D) is Cs reelection with Es
performance. The reason is that stronger party discipline implies more incentive for the
congress member but at the same time less incentive for the executive, who can now partly
delegate" the goal of controlling the two branches of government to the congress member
and free-ride" on Cs e¤ort. The voter thus adopts an optimal voting rule for Cs reelection
that is less dependent on Es performance the stronger the party discipline is.
Consider now the equilibrium levels of the e¤orts e E and e
 
C , which have the same func-
tional form for the two states. The only di¤erence is that under unied government,   = U ,
they depend on the level of party discipline #E that the executive enforces in the congress.
Under divided government,   = D, they depend on the level of party discipline #O that
the opposition leader enforces in the congress. The reason for this is that the politicians
preferences are symmetric between the two states, which implies symmetry of the optimal
retrospective voting rules. Note, moreover, that the executives e¤ort e E decreases and the
congress members e¤ort e C increases with the level #j of party discipline in the congress:
de E
d#j
< 0 and de
 
C
d#j
> 0. As mentioned above, stronger party discipline leads to extra incentive
for the congress member and less incentive for the executive. Under the optimal retrospective
voting rules, the congress member will be incentivized to exert higher e¤ort to implement
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the party leaderships goal of controlling both branches of government. The executive, mean-
while, will exert less e¤ort, as she can free-ride on the performance of the disciplined congress
member. It is important to stress that the sum of the incumbentse¤orts e E + e
 
C increases
with the level #j of party discipline in the congress:
d(e E+e
 
C)
d#j
> 0. So the stronger the party
discipline, the better o¤ the representative voter is. Note, moreover, that the equilibrium
levels of the e¤orts e E and e
 
C decrease with variance 
2 of the politiciansability (since more
randomness in the incumbentsperformances makes the reelection probabilities less sensitive
to e¤ort and thus reduces the incumbentsincentives).15
Party Discipline
Consider now the problem of a party leader j 2 fE;Og who has to decide on the level of
party discipline #j to impose on her partys congress member. The leader of the governing
party, i.e., the executive E, can control the legislature only in the case of unied government,
since under divided government the congress member is a¢ liated with the opposite party.
In contrast, the leader of the opposition O can impose party discipline only under divided
government. The party leaders net objective functions can be found by substituting e E ,
e C , 
 
E , and 
 
C into 	
U
E (eE ; eC) and 	
D
O (eE ; eC) (a detailed derivation can be found in the
Appendix). This yields
	UE (#E) =
1
4
+
1
2
arctan
(1 + #E)
2
2
  k#
2
E
2
  1
162
0@ 1q
1 + #2E
+
1q
5 + 4#E + #
2
E
1A2 ;
	DO (#O) =
1
4
+
1
2
arctan
(1 + #O)
2
2
  k#
2
O
2
;
where arctan () is the arctangent function. Note that stronger party discipline (higher #j)
increases the probability of the party controlling both branches of government. In the case
of unied government,   = U , stronger party discipline implies more positively aligned in-
cumbentspreferences, so that the voter uses more positively correlated retrospective voting
rules. Under these rules, the incumbents are more likely to be reelected together than they
are to receive opposite rewards. Thus, the probability that both incumbents will be reelected
increases with the level of party discipline #E that the executive imposes under unied gov-
ernment. In the case of divided government,   = D, stronger party discipline leads to more
negatively aligned incumbentspreferences. The voter then applies more negatively correlated
15 It is important to stress that variance 2 of the politiciansability is required to be quite di¤erent from zero
in order to guarantee that the politiciansindividual rationality (i.e., participation) constraints are satised.
In particular, the results hold for values of   1.
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voting rules. Thus, it is more likely that one incumbent will be dismissed while the other
is reelected. So the probability that the congress member is reelected while the executive is
thrown out of o¢ ce increases with the level of party discipline #O that the opposition leader
imposes under divided government.
Owing to the symmetry of the party leaderspreferences, the voter uses linear retrospec-
tive voting rules that are symmetric between the states. So the probability of controlling
both branches of government has the same functional form for the two states. The only
di¤erence is that under unied government,   = U , this probability depends on the level of
party discipline #E that the leader of the governing party (i.e., the executive) enforces in the
congress. Under divided government,   = D, it depends on the level of party discipline #O
that the opposition leader enforces on her partys congress member. However, the net objec-
tive functions of the party leaders di¤er between the states such that 	UE (#E) < 	
D
O (#O) for
any #E = #O 2 [0; 1]. The reason is that under unied government, the executive takes into
account the e¤ect of imposing party discipline on her own performance in o¢ ce. Es choice
of the level of party discipline #E modies the amount of e¤ort eE that E puts into policy
implementation, and the cost of this e¤ort, e
2
E
2 , which is included in Es objective function
	UE . The following proposition species the party leadersoptimal choices of the levels of
party discipline in the congress. (The proof is straightforward.16)
Proposition 3. Under unied government,   = U , the executive imposes a level of party
discipline #E , which is a decreasing function of the cost parameter k, dened implicitly by
the rst-order condition
d
d#E
	UE (#

E) = 0 if k 
7 + 2
p
5 + 402
2002
and
#E = 1 if k <
7 + 2
p
5 + 402
2002
:
Under divided government,   = D, the opposition leader imposes a level of party discipline
#O, which is a decreasing function of the cost parameter k, dened implicitly by the rst-order
condition
d
d#O
	DO (#

O) = 0 if k 
1
5
and
#O = 1 if k <
1
5
:
Moreover, the executive always enforces stronger party discipline in the congress than the
opposition leader does, i.e., #E  #O for any cost parameter k > 0.
16One can check that the second-order conditions hold.
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The reason why the executive E imposes more party discipline than does the opposition
leader O is that the amount of e¤ort that E puts into policy implementation, eE , decreases
with #E , and so does the corresponding e¤ort cost
e2E
2 . The executive, therefore, is more eager
than the opposition leader to impose party discipline, since that leads to less policy work for
the executive. Indeed, stronger party discipline implies a higher amount of e¤ort eC by the
congress member towards policy implementation and allows the executive to free-ride" on
her partys congress members performance.
The level of party discipline that the executive imposes under unied government ap-
proaches that of the opposition leader under divided government as the variance 2 of the
politiciansability increases: lim!1 #E
 
2

= #O. A larger variance 2 implies more ran-
domness in the politiciansperformances and makes the reelection probabilities less sensitive
to e¤ort. The executive therefore exerts less e¤ort eE , and the executives incentive to impose
party discipline approaches that for the opposition leader.
It is important to mention that ensuring party discipline in the congress improves not
only the gross utility of the party leaders but also the utility of the representative voter. In
fact, if party discipline were cheap to impose, there would be no conict of interest between
the voter and the party leaders, who would prefer the highest possible level of party discipline
in the congress. Since party discipline is costly to impose, however, the party leaders choose
a moderate level of party discipline that maximizes their net utility. But imposing party
discipline has an ambiguous e¤ect on the congress members utility. For large values of the
variance 2 of the politiciansability, the congress members utility increases with stronger
party discipline. A lower variance 2 increases the congress members e¤ort such that at some
point his net utility begins to change nonmonotonically with the level of party discipline.
4. Conclusions
This paper has studied party discipline under the assumption of o¢ ce-motivated politicians.
In a political agency model with moral hazard, party discipline serves as an incentive device
to motivate legislators to perform in line with the party leadersobjective of controlling both
the executive and the legislative branches of government.
The party leaders choose to impose party discipline to delegate," in some sense, the
party line of controlling the two branches of government to their partys congress member.
Stronger party discipline implies more aligned incumbentspreferences. As a result, the voter
adopts more correlated retrospective voting rules, conditioned on the government being uni-
ed or divided. In the case of unied government, the reelection outcomes for the incumbents
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are positively correlated to incentivize the congress member, who wants the executive to be
reelected. Under divided government, the reelection outcomes are negatively correlated to
incentivize the congress member, who wants the executive to be thrown out of o¢ ce and
the congress members partisan ally to win the presidential election. The congress member
therefore performs better, for the sake of his party as well as for himself. So the executive can
free-ride on the congress members performance, which decreases the executives e¤ort. How-
ever, the aggregate performance of the incumbents increases with stronger party discipline,
so the representative voter becomes better o¤.
The probability of controlling both branches of government is strictly increasing in the
level of party discipline. In the case of unied government, the reelection outcomes are
positively correlated, so the executive and the congress member are more likely to be reelected
together. Under divided government, the reelection outcomes are negatively correlated, and
it is more likely that the congress member is reelected while the executive is thrown out of
o¢ ce. The results show that the leader of the governing party (i.e., the executive) imposes
stronger party discipline under unied government than does the opposition leader under
divided government. The reason is that the executive takes into account the impact of party
discipline on her own policy e¤ort and on the associated cost of this e¤ort, which are strictly
decreasing in the level of party discipline.
Even though the model is very stylized, it yields a number of empirically testable predic-
tions. First, according to my results, stronger party discipline in the congress is expected to
increase the probability that the same party will control both branches of government, i.e.,
the probability of unied government. Second, the predictions indicate that the leader of the
governing party imposes stronger party discipline on her partys congress members under uni-
ed government than does the opposition leader under divided government. Finally, stronger
party discipline is expected to increase the aggregate performance of the incumbents. Testing
these predictions implies identifying and measuring party discipline. This might be a hard
but feasible task, and has been addressed to some extent by a number of authors (see the
references to empirical studies of party discipline in the Introduction).
Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
The executive E is reelected if pE+EpC  e0E+Ee0C or aE+EaC  e0E eE+E (e0C   eC),
where aE +EaC  N
 
0;
 
1 + 2E

2

. The congress member C is reelected if pC +CpE 
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e0C + Ce
0
E or aC + CaE  e0C   eC + C (e0E   eE), where aC + CaE  N
 
0;
 
1 + 2C

2

.
The density function of a bivariate normal distribution of random variables aE + EaC and
aC + CaE , denoted by faE+EaC ;aC+CaE (x; y), is
faE+EaC ;aC+CaE (x; y) =
1
22 (1  EC) exp
(
 (x  Ey)
2 + (y   Cx)2
22 (1  EC)2
)
:
Note that the condition EC < 1 guarantees that this density function is well dened. The
executives net objective is equal to
	UE (eE ; eC) =
+1Z
e0E eE+E(e0C eC)
2664
+1Z
e0C eC+C(e0E eE)
faE+EaC ;aC+CaE (x; y) dy
3775 dx  e2E2   k#2E2 ;
	DE (eE ; eC) =
+1Z
e0E eE+E(e0C eC)
264
e0C eC+C(e0E eE)Z
 1
faE+EaC ;aC+CaE (x; y) dy
375 dx  e2E
2
:
One should carefully take the rst-order condition with respect to actual e¤ort eE , taking e0E
as given. After imposing the equilibrium requirements e0E = eE and e
0
C = eC , one obtains the
executives equilibrium e¤ort e E under linear retrospective voting rules E and C , EC < 1:
eUE =
1
2
p
2
0@ 1q
1 + 2E
+
Cq
1 + 2C
1A ;
eDE =
1
2
p
2
0@ 1q
1 + 2E
  Cq
1 + 2C
1A :
It is straightforward to check that the second-order condition holds.
The congress members net objective is equal to
	UC (eE ; eC) = #E
+1Z
e0E eE+E(e0C eC)
2664
+1Z
e0C eC+C(e0E eE)
faE+EaC ;aC+CaE (x; y) dy
3775 dx
+
 
1  FaC+CaE
 
e0C   eC + C
 
e0E   eE
  e2C
2
;
	DC (eE ; eC) = #O
e0E eE+E(e0C eC)Z
 1
2664
+1Z
e0C eC+C(e0E eE)
faE+EaC ;aC+CaE (x; y) dy
3775 dx
+
 
1  FaC+CaE
 
e0C   eC + C
 
e0E   eE
  e2C
2
;
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where F denotes the normal distribution function. Take the rst-order condition with respect
to actual e¤ort eC , taking e0C as given, and afterwards impose the equilibrium requirements
e0E = eE and e
0
C = eC . This yields the congress members equilibrium e¤ort e
 
C under linear
retrospective voting rules E and C , EC < 1:
eUC =
#E
2
p
2
0@ 1q
1 + 2C
+
Eq
1 + 2E
1A+ 1p
2
q
1 + 2C
;
eDC =
#O
2
p
2
0@ 1q
1 + 2C
  Eq
1 + 2E
1A+ 1p
2
q
1 + 2C
:
The second-order condition for the congress members problem holds too.
B. Derivation of the party leadersobjective functions 	UE
 
eUE; e
U
C

and 	DO
 
eDE ; e
D
C

Under unied government,   = U , the voter applies the linear retrospective voting rules
determined by scalars UE and 
U
C , and the incumbents exert e¤orts e
U
E and e
U
C . Es objective
function is thus equal to
	UE
 
eUE ; e
U
C

=
+1Z
e0E eUE+UE(e0C eUC)
2664
+1Z
e0C eUC+UC(e0E eUE)
faE+UEaC ;aC+
U
CaE
(x; y) dy
3775 dx eU2E2  k#2E2 :
Imposing the equilibrium requirements e0E = e
U
E and e
0
C = e
U
C and plugging in the equilibrium
values of eUE , e
U
C , 
U
E and 
U
C yields
	UE (#E) =
+1Z
0
24 +1Z
0
faE+#EaC ;aC+ 12+#E aE
(x; y) dy
35 dx  k#2E
2
  1
162
0@ 1q
1 + #2E
+
1q
5 + 4#E + #
2
E
1A2 =
1
4
+
1
2
arctan
(1 + #E)
2
2
  k#
2
E
2
  1
162
0@ 1q
1 + #2E
+
1q
5 + 4#E + #
2
E
1A2 ;
where arctan () is the arctangent function.
Under divided government,   = D, the voter uses the linear retrospective voting rules
determined by scalars DE and 
D
C , and the incumbents exert e¤orts e
D
E and e
D
C . The objective
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function of the opposition leader O is
	DO
 
eDE ; e
D
C

=
e0E eDE+DE (e0C eDC )Z
 1
2664
+1Z
e0C eDC+DC (e0E eDE )
faE+DEaC ;aC+
D
C aE
(x; y) dy
3775 dx  k#2O2 :
After imposing the equilibrium requirements e0E = e
U
E and e
0
C = e
U
C and plugging in the
equilibrium values of eUE , e
U
C , 
U
E and 
U
C , Os objective function becomes
	DO (#O) =
0Z
 1
24 +1Z
0
faE #OaC ;aC  12+#O aE
(x; y) dy
35 dx  k#2O
2
=
1
4
+
1
2
arctan
(1 + #O)
2
2
  k#
2
O
2
:
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